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A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
In the United States Navy's budget development process
each of the Navy's major claimants submit its own budget for
inclusion into the overall Department of the Navy (DON)
budget. These budgets are developed over long periods of
time and reflect huge amounts of effort in planning for the
funds required to support the claimant's operations and
expansion plans. As these initial budgets are changed, first
by the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) and then by the
Office of the secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), further efforts are expendea to
change plans and funding requirements to reflect the changes
in the budget. Through the understanding of the roles and
strategies used by NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB in their budget
review process, the claimants may be able to produce initial
budgets wrier will be more resistant to unfavorable changes.
This could result in a savings of effort involved in the
budget planning time and more stable budgeting practices.
The budgeting process is explored in detail tc give the
reader a firm understanding of the budgeting process.
Similar studies conducted in this area of research are
utilized as supporting analysis for similar findings and to
examine conflicting findings for causal relationships.
Through the data provided by the office of the
Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) for fiscal year FY1990,
the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M.N) appropriations
account is examined. The data is analyzed to identify
consistent patterns of behavior in the roles and strategies
of the budget review authorities. Claimant strategies are
reviewed to identify strategies that predict budget review
reactions. Strategies used by NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB to change
budgets are analyzed for consistency, causal effect
relationships and criteria used to make changes. Conclusions
are drawn indicating the expected reactions to the various
strategies available to the major claimants in developing
their initial budgets.
B. BUDGETING WITHIN THE NAVY
The Navy's budget is developed through the planning
programming and budgeting system (PPBS). This system
develops a five year defense plan and updates it yearly to
develop a biennial budget. Tne first fiscal year cf this
budget is submitted to congress for funding. Through the
understanding of PPBS, its history, how it works, and its
positive and negative aspects, the reader will better
understand the roles and strategies of the agencies involved.
1 . The History of PPBS
The path of budgetary reform in the Department of
Defense (DOD) was laid in 1949 with the Hoover Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. They
recommended that the government adopt a budget based upon
functions, activities, and projects. [Ref. 1:p.138] This
was followed by the Rand study, Efficiency and Economy in
Government Through New Budgeting Procedures in 1954. This
recommended a program budgeting method to be used by the DOD
.
In 1955 the Committee for Economic Development presented a
statement calling for program budgeting to be used throughout
the federal government.
In 1963 the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara
instituted the Planning Programming And Budgeting System
(PPBS) into the DOD budget process. Since then DOD has used
the PPBS to develop ever/ budget. On August 25, 1965,
President Johnson announced that PPBS would be used
throughout all executive branch agencies.
During the next few years the executive agencies made
various attempts tc institute budgeting through the use of
programs, none were completely successful. In many cases
implementation never went beyond the stage cf agreeing to
implement. [Ref. 2] Other agencies never quite understood
what was expected of therr,. When the Nixon administration
failed to shew any interest in instituting the PPBS, the
agencies ended their program budgeting efforts. This left
DOD as the only department using PPBS.
2. The PPBS Process
The PPBS is a decision making process of allocating
defense resources. Using this process DOD is able to look at
objectives, present costs, and future expenditures while
preparing their budget. It breaks the budget into eleven
basic programs: Strategic Forces, Intelligence and
Communications Forces, Supply and Maintenance Forces, General
Purpose Forces, Airlift and Sealift Forces, Reserve and
National Guard Forces, Research and Development Forces,
Training and Personnel Forces, Administration Forces, Support
of Other Nations, and Special Operations Forces. These
programs consist of over 800 different elements. The
programs cross service lines and enable the Secretary of
Defense to make allocation of resource decisions among
competing programs and alternatives.
Previously defense budgets had been formulated by
focusing on the existing base and adding incremental
improvements to it. The whole question of how much a weapon
system costs over time was overlooked, as the traditional
budgeting format of focusing on the immediate future did not
allow for its inclusion. Budgets were prepared for one year
at a time. The PPBS develops a five year budget, and updates
it year 1 y
.
The focus of PPBS is on objectives, purposes, and the
long-term alternative means for achieving them. In his
statement to his cabinet members and agency heads on August
4
25, 1965, President Johnson proclaimed that PPBS will enable
us to
:
1. Identify our national goals with precision and on a
continuing basis.
2. Choose among those goals the ones that are the most
urgent
.
3. Search for alternative means of achieving those goals
most effectively and at the least cost.
4. Inform ourselves not merely on next years costs, but on
second, and third, and subsequent year's costs of our
programs
.
5. Measure the performance of our programs to insure a
dollar's worth of service for each dollar spent. [Ref.
1:p, 150]
In summary PPBS is a cyclic process containing three
distinct but interwoven phases. It looks at anticipated
threats and a strategy is developed. From this strategy,
requirements are estimated and programs are developed to
execute the strategy. Once the programs are developed, the
costs of the programs are put into a budget.
3 . PI ann i ng
The first phase of PPBS is the planning stage. In
this stage biennial plans are developed that encompass 15
years. They include the FYDP and a 10 year planning period
beyond the FYDP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assess the
threats which face this nation. They produce the biennial
Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA), and the
biennial Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). The JLRSA
contains the military departments long range plans and
provides a transition from long-range to mid-range strategic
5
planning. Its purpose is to stimulate focused strategic
studies and to influence the development of the JSPD. The
JSPD assesses threats to the United States and our interests
world wide. It recommends military objectives, strategies
and force levels to meet these threats. It also includes an
appraisal of the capabilities and risks associated with
programmed force levels, and recommends changes to force
planning and program guidance. The estimates and
recommendations it provides are not fiscally constrained.
Their job is to determine what level of defense we need not
what level we can afford.
The JCS presents the JSPD to the Secretary of Defense
and the Defense Resource Board (DRB) in June o^ the odd
numbered years. On alternate years the Joint Strategic
Planning Document Supporting Analyses is provided.
Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands also
provide the Secretary of Defense and the DRB with their
personal appraisals of major issues and problems of their
commands. [Ref. 3] The DRB is responsible for managing the
planning process.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
considers the military advise of the JCS submitted in the
JLRSA and the JSPD, and develops a draft of the Defense
Guidance (DG). This draft is submitted to all DOD
components, the National Security Council, the Department of
State, and the Office of Management and Budget for comment.
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They comment on major issues, problems, and resource
constraints which affect the policy, strategy, and management
required to meet the threat.
The OSD then drafts a final version of the DG . The
DG is developed biennially and revised annually by the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy). [Ref. 4] It contains the
statement of threat, military objectives, strategy, and force
planning guidance. It consists of the following elements:
- Near and long-term threat assessment and opportunities.
- Policy and strategy guidance.
- Force planning guidance.
- Resource planning guidance.
- Fiscal guidance which gives each department its
specific outlay by fiscal year.
- Unresolved issues requiring further study.
The publishing of the DG occurs in January of even numbered
years, 23 months prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.
This marks the end of the planning stage of PPBS.
4 . P r o g r amm i n g
In the programming stage each DOD component takes the
DG and develops programs that are prioritized and costed out.
These programs, expressed in the form of a Program Objective
Memorandum (POM), are based on and comply with the DG
.
Proposed programs are projected for five years, and forces
are projected for eight years. [Ref. 4:p. A-2] The
programming stage begins in September before the DG is
published, and ends in May, 16 months prior to the FY.
The Secretary of the Navy issues the Department of
the Navy Planning and Programing Guidance (DNPPG) . This
identifies areas requiring attention by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC)
and civilian executive assistants in the development of the
POM. The CNO uses this to develop the CNO Policy and
Planning Guidance, and the CNO Program and Fiscal Guidance
(CPFG)
.
Using this guidance CNO Program Analysis Memorandum
(CPAM) are developed. The C p AMs are issued in the areas of
support and logistics, manpower, personnel and training,
fleet support and strategic mobility, tentative program
summary, and program decision summary. The CPAMs address the
Navy's capability to carry out its goals and objectives.
Each CPAM is fiscally balanced in accordance with the (CPFG),
and developed from the inputs presented by the major
c 1 aimants
.
Program issues and alternatives presented in the
CPAMs are reviewed by the Program Development Review
Committee (PDRC), the CNO Executive Board, and OSD. After
review they are updated and CPAMs 2 are released.
The program sponsors update the program data base to
reflect the fiscal and manpower controls and tentative CNO
program decisions. Major changes are described and justified
8
in program summary documents produced by the resource
sponsor. The PDRC reviews these issues and submit the
Program Decision Summary (PDS) to the CNO for approval and
resolution as needed. The appropriation sponsors review the
PDS and advise as to what packaging changes can be made to
improve the likelihood of success at the DOD budget table.
After these changes are made, the Navy POM is ready to submit
to OSD, and the JCS . The Navy POM contains detailed
recommendations for application of DON resources. It
contains an analysis of the missions and objectives to be
achieved, alternative methods of accomplishing them, and the
allocation of resources. In addition to the budget year, the
program period is the four years beyond the budget year for
cost and manpower, seven years beyond the budget year for
forces . [Ref . 3]
The JCS review the POMs submitted by the DOD
components for the adequacy of the composite force, and
resource levels presented. They issue a risk assessment of
the ability of the forces to execute the strategy outlined in
the DG, in the form of the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum (JPAM) to OSD. The JPAM may recommend changes to
improve overall defense capabilities within alternative
funding levels directed by the Secretary of Defense.
Based on a review of the POM in relation to the DG
and JPAM, issues shall be prepared by the OSD staff, the DOD
components and the OMB. One page outlines of proposed major
9
issues may be submitted by any DRB or Program Review Group
(PRG) (a working group subordinate to the DRB) member. The
issues should have broad policy, force, program, or resource
implications. Particular emphasis should be given to cross-
service issues that have not been adequately, or
consistently, addressed in the POMs. Major issues that were
decided during the previous year's program and budget review
should be addressed only if some major new factors have
appeared since that decision. [Ref. 3:p. A-14]
These issues are reviewed by the PRG and appropriate
ones are included in Issue Books (IBs) and sent to the DRB
for consideration. The full DRB meets to discuss the issues.
Major issues are measured against the DG , budget resources,
and management initiatives. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
makes all appropriate decisions after consulting with the
Secretary. The review decisions are recorded in a set of
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), signed by the Secretary or
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and distributed to the DOD
components and the OMB in May, 16 months prior to the FY.
The PDMs are the basis for the budget decisions.
5. Budgeting
In DON, budgeting consists of four steps: (1) the
submission of budget estimates to the Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) for review and approval by SECNAV; (2) the
submission of budget estimates to the OSD and the OMB for
review and approval by SECDEF and the President; (3) the
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submission of the President's Budget to the congress for its
review and approval; and (4) the execution by the DON of
enacted appropriations. A DON budget is developed for each
of these phases, consistent with the Department's
decentralization policy, i.e., that the offices responsible
for budget execution will participate in developing budget
estimates, subject to the guidance of higher authority.
[Ref. 4:p. A-3] This thesis is only concerned with the first
two steps. The actions congress takes on the DON budget, and
the budget's execution are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Long before the programming phase ends Naval offices
are busy collecting data, developing budgets, and submitting
them to NAVCOMPT. These initial budgets are based on
congressional, OMB, OSD, and SECNAV actions. From these
actions NAVCOMPT compiles information and develops a budget
call which it sends to Navy Claimants. From this guidance
and standing instructions the Claimants prepare and submit
their initial budgets.
When the POM is completed NAVCOMPT issues another
budget call. This budget call includes estimates based on
the first year of the FYDP . These spending levels are called
control numbers. The Claimants use this budget call to
revise and resubmit their budgets to NAVCOMPT. This budget
is based on the approved programs. All program increases,
decreases and realignments from the previous year are
identified, and new emergent unfunded deficiencies are
1 1
included. After collecting all of their claimants inputs,
NAVCOMPT reviews the budgets and recommends changes referred
to as the mark-up. These changes are based on the following
cr i ter i a
:
- Appropriation and fiscal status and implications
- Financial feasibility and balance
- Validity and respons i b 1 eness of cost and pricing
- Validity and relationship to planned objectives
- Legality [Ref. 6]
A f ter NAVCOMPT has made the mark-ups, claimants are
allowed to challenge them with a reclama. A reclama is a one
page document which addresses a specific issue and the
rationale used in the mark-up. Differences between NAVCOMPT
and the claimant's budgets are resolved by the Director of
Navy Program Planning. After resolving all the budget issues
NAVCOMPT submits the DON budget to OSD and OMB concurrently
in mid-September, 13 months prior to the FY.
During the Fall the OSD staff conducts a budget
review with the OMB. All DOD components participate in this
review, and recommend changes with reclamas. Program Budget
Decisions (PBDs) signed by the Secretary or the Deputy
Secretary of Defense are issued once decisions are reached.
These decisions will address all of the resources in the
budget request and be related to the appropriation and budget
activity structure o* the DOD. The decisions will include
the current year, the budget year, the authorization year
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(budget year + 1) and an estimate of the resource impact on
the three succeeding program years. Priority will be placed
on assuring that budgets are prepared to true program cost
for all years and that af fordab i 1 i ty in the out-years is
explicitly reviewed and examined.
While the review is progressing, the DRB shall meet
periodically to consider component appeals of Secretary or
Deputy Secretary of Defense decisions, to discuss proposed
decisions, to examine out-year aff ordab i 1 ity of current
decisions, to prepare or agree on recommendations to the
President, and to provide to the components the results of
the Secretary's meeting with the President. The DRB shall
also provide guidance and recommendations for program
cancellations or reductions to meet fiscal guidance, and
provide for budget i ng-tc-cost of individual programs.
After review of the tentative budget decisions, DOD
Components may identify issues that are serious enough to
warrant a major issue meeting with the Secretary of Defense.
Later decisions made by the Secretary will be announced in
revisions to issued PBDs . [Ref. 3] The final PPBS decisions
are then incorporated into the Presidents Budget and
submitted to Congress in January.
This thesis examines the initial budgets submitted by
the navy major claimants, NAVCOMPTs actions on these budgets
and the reclamas submitted, and OSD/OMB actions on the
budgets and reclamas submitted to them.
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6. Benefits of ppbs
' r a:-*.-c r 5' budgeting methods used prior the
- p or or 5 = BS we r e concerned with inDuts o r-
'e::. r :%:. The PPBS f ;:.ses or outputs. Previously, defense
expenditures r ac :ee r considered ir traditiora" line-item
form, focusing or categc r - es such as maintenance, supplies,
personnel, a"s equipment; and the budget presented by the
Secretary of ^e r e';e * a s really a comb i nat i or c f Army , Navy,
and a - - "o r ce budgets. ~^e whole question of how much a
weapor systei '--.it was not brought in systematically, either
to determine t r e 'ea'. 'o: ' ;:/ s r t r,e program or to evaluate
its e'' " : -i=' :y. [Ref. 1:p. ".23] The Defense Department
ofter 'o:/e'i like a collectior o* wa r -ing principalities,
with decision-making colored at all levels by one-upmanship
of inter service rivalry. [ Re r . 1] For the first time, under
PPB_>
,
mar/ Components we r e forced to define what their
objectives really we^e. This may be the greatest advantage
to PPE^.
The former budget was projected for only one year
into the future, and the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretaries of the three departments put all their emphasis
on "next year's budget"-a budget that could not translate
resources into objectives, could not project the future
resource implications of proposed actions, and that did not
tinguish between one-time investment outlays and
recurring, or annual operating, expenses. [Ref. 7]
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The need for PPBS stems from two sources. First, the
resources of government are limited so they must be
distributed to gain the most value. Second, government
needs a regulator that tells us when an activity stops being
productive and should be altered or replaced. The importance
of thinking in program terms is that, in addition to
clarifying objectives, it helps move discussion away from the
fairly useless absolutes of (a) what fixed amounts of money
to spend no matter what the goals, or (b) what fixed
objectives to achieve no matter what the costs. [Ref. 1:p.
141]
Wildavsky argues that PPBs greatest success, has been
in changing the budgetary atmosphere. It brought increased
attention to the need to improve analysis and to develop more
rational decision rules. [Ref. 2]
PPBS provides for forward planning in its FYDP and
provides for techniques to evaluate costs and benefits. All
programs must be quantified in specific benefit and cost
terms. Although all policies are ultimately made on the
basis of judgement they don't need to be made in the fog of
inadequate and inaccurate data prevalent prior to the
implementation of PPBS. PPBS provides data to help officials
make decisions. It is not a mechanical substitution for the
good judgement, political wisdom, and leadership of those
off icial s . [Ref . 1
]
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7. Weaknesses of PPBS
Wildavsky calls PPBS an elaborate apparatus that does
not work. He claims that PPBS does not work because it can
not work. Failure is into its very nature because it
requires ability to perform cognitive operations that are
beyond present human (or mechanical) capabilities. [Ref.
2:p. 206]
One major problem is that there is no agreement on
the definition of a program. Just what one means by an end-
product or a program is not unambiguous. The line of
demarkation between programs and objectives is not clear cut.
Is the Military Air Transport Service a program cr simp'ly an
activity supporting, say, the Tactical Air Program? Or is
even the latter merely something to be purchased for a
program that might be called deterrence and fighting of
limited wars? Even such tasks as providing nuclear striking
power and providing forces for limited war have
interrelationships. Neither is solely a supporting activity
of the other, yet each can influence the credibility and
effectiveness of the other. It may seem that one is driven
to regard every military item and activity as an object
purchased for and contributing to one program--nat iona
1
security. The unique function of a program budget is to
implement the conclusions of a political philosophy through
the assignment of resources. In a number of areas no clear
objectives have been laid down. [Ref. 1
: pp . 140-141]
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Another problem is in the measurement of costs and
benefits. A precise measure of benefits or effectiveness of
one method of achieving a goal verses another is impossible
to achieve. The decision then comes down to judgement and
political bargaining. How costs are measured is just as
impossible, political costs, dollar outlays, the cost of
human lives, all have to be weighed and compared. It is
critically claimed that, in order to justify their pet
programs and personal judgments; officials produce vast
amounts of useless information, characterized by premature
quantification of irrelevant items. [Ref. 2] These massive
doses of information are tec much to evaluate, thus the
system is overloaded and the decisions are made through pure
judgement
.
The President's Blue Ribbon Commission or, Defense
Management pointed out numerous problems with PPBS. They
reported
:
- A lack of clarity in the strategic goals of DOD
- An inability of the JCS system to make meaningful program
inputs
- Instead of rational choices of programs and weapons most
needed to serve national purposes, such choices are still
largely determined by service needs and service
interests, resulting in duplication of some programs,
mi sal locat ion of resources to others, and most important,
neglect of still others.
- Failure of the PPBS to emphasize the output side of the
defense program
- An insufficient relationship between strategic planning
and fiscal constraints.
17
Insufficient attention in the PPBS to execution
oversight and control. [Ref. 10]
Wildavsky is extremely critical of PPBS. In addition
to the problems already mentioned he makes the following
poi nts
:
- PPBS is not cost effective. It produces costly
rationales for inevitable failures.
- PPBS sacrifices the rationality of ends to the
rationality of means.
- Five-year budget conceived in the hodgepodge terms of the
program structure serves no purpose.
- PPBS discredits policy analysis. To collect vast amounts
of random data is hardly a serious analysis of public
pol icy . [Ref . 2]
It can be argued that any budgeting system, designed
to construct a budget as large and complex as the DOD ' s is,
will be flawed in many ways. The PPBS process is no
exception to this. While it has its' faults, it does work,
and will be used for the foreseeable future.
Through the understanding of the PPBS process,
provided in this chapter, the reader can better appreciate
the roles and strategies of the participants. The next two
chapters examine how the PPBS process is used, and detail the
actions of the Major Claimants, and the reviewing agencies.
18
I I . BACKGROUND
A. LELOUP/MORELAND STUDY ON BUDGETING IN THE DOA
Other studies have been done to examine the methodologies
used by governmental reviewing authorities in cutting
budgets. Lance T. LeLoup, and William B. Moreland reviewed
the budgets of the department of agriculture (DOA), from 1946
through 1971. They looked at the budgets submitted by the
agencies and the subsequent changes made by the DOA, the OMB,
and congress
.
While the aggregate budgets appeared tc change in smooth
increments, they found great variations in the budgets of the
agencies which make up the DOA. They traced the degree of
success or budget expansion to the extent the agency was
assertive or aggressive in its budget request. Assert i veness
or aggressiveness is defined as the tendency for agencies to
pursue an active strategy of expansion in their programs and
fundings. [Ref. 12:p. 182] A requested increase of ten
percent or more was defined as aggressive.
They found that the larger the increase requested the
more it was cut, but budgets are not cut in proportion to the
requested increase or decrease. Agencies asking for large
increases wound up with a larger share than those requesting
moderate increases. tn fact agencies requesting moderate
increases averaged an overall decline in appropriations.
Tables 2-1 and 2-2, indicate the results of their research.
19



































































They found that the department (DOA ) attempted to balance
the extremes. It protected the moderate agencies by adding
back to decreases requested, and cut very little from
moderate requests. It increased the budgets of those asking
for ten-25 percent increases and it cut deeply into the most
aggressive requests. The greater the increase asked for the
larger the cut. This however; still left the more aggressive
agencies with much larger dollar increases than any other
category
.
The OMB it was found is the main obstacle to agency
growth. It cuts across the board in a mechanical method, and
it does not increase the budgets of any group. Even more
significant is the finding that moderation in requests
certainly confers no advantages in terms of support from the
OMB. [Ref. 1 2 : p . 186
]
Congress makes the smallest changes overall. it cut more
deeply into the larger increases requested, but increased the
requests frorr. the largest category. They also restored some
of the OMB cuts to the agencies requesting a decrease. The
increase given to the most assertive group is attributed to
actions by those agencies to build support in congress.
In summary they found that the normal strategy of
moderation postulated by the incremental theorists is more
myth than reality. The strategy of moderation may be
desirable for agencies seeking certainty, stability, and high
support of their initial request, but it will not lead to
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agency growth and may in fact lead to agency decline. To
obtain substantial nonincremental increases in programs and
budgets, an agency must attain a position of political
strength (with support inside and outside of government) to
justify a large increase. Don't come in too high is poor
advice for an agency wishing to receive more money; come in
as high as you can justify would appear to be better advise
based on the results of this study. [Ref. 12:p. 191]
B. PAST RESEARCH IN ASSERTIVE BUDGETING
Lieutenant Jack Housley, United States Navy (1986)
examined the Department of the Navy; operations and
maintenance, Navy (O&M.N) budget for FY 1987. Like LeLoup
and Moreland, he looked at the budgets submitted by the
agencies, in this case the navy major claimants. He
classified the claimants' initial budget requests as
aggressive or moderate. The aggressive or assertive requests
were those requesting an increase of ten percent or mere over
the preceding years budget. He examined the budget cutting
actions of NAVCOMPT, OSD/OMB , and the actions that each took
on reclamas submitted to influence these cuts.
He found that the O&M , N budget changed in smooth
increments, but that budget participants didn't receive
changes in proportion to their previous budget share. The
claimants using an aggressive budgeting strategy received the
bulk of the increases. Although the average claimant asked
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for budget increases, more asked for a decrease than
requested increases greater than ten percent. This differs
significantly from the DOA agencies in the LeLoup-More 1 and
study. In that study only 60 agencies requested a decrease
and 339 asked for more than ten percent. This indicates that
the Navy's claimants may be less aggressive in seeking budget
increases than the agencies of the DOA.
The support of NAVCOMPT he found, was critical to the
aggressive claimants. Without it OSD/OMB cut their requests
and with support, their increases were almost always
approved. For non aggressive claimants NAVCOMPT support is
not as important. Their initial request is the strongest
determinant of their budget.
His analysis differs with that of LeLoup-More 1 and in
that, NAVCOMP" ur, 'ike OSD did not attempt to balance the
extremes. It is just as likely to increase the requested
budget as to decrease it. He found that the role NAVCOMPT
took was to check the claimants requests for budget
feasibility, verify the accuracy of estimates, and evaluate
to see if it reflects PPBS decisions.
His findings like those of LeLoup-More 1 and , show that
OSD/OMB is the main obstacle to growth and that they are very
mechanical in their cuts. In addition, moderation in budget
requests appears to have no advantage in securing support
from the OSD/OMB budget review. [Ref. 13:p. 32] Moderate
increases are cut along with aggressive increases. He also
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found that the claimants requesting the largest increases,
received the largest cuts, but still wound up with far
greater increases than their moderate counterparts. The
actions of NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB are displayed below.
TABLE 2-3
Changes in Agency Requests Made by Reviewing Authorities
Average NCOMPT OSD OMB
Claimant Claimant Request Request
Asserriveness I ncrease Mark-up Mark-up Average
Categories Requested I ncrease I ncrease Growth N
Decrease -0.29 -0.01 -0.03 -31% (10)
0-4.9% 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -3% (3)
5-9.9% 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 6% (17)
10-14.9% 0.13 0.09 -0.C2 18% (3)
Over 15% 0.17 -0.01 -0.06 11% (5)
[Ref. 13:p. 33]
In the area of reclama success he found that although
both NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB are just as likely to cut, only
NAVCOMPT is likely to restore funds as a result of the
reclama process. He attributes this to four reasons. First
DOD and DON discourage reclamas to OSD/OMB cuts. Next, most
OSD/OMB cuts are conducted on line items for which the
claimant has very little input. OSD/OMB makes a significant
number of their cuts based on congressional action, revised
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services rates, revised economic assumptions, and repricing
of commodities (i.e. fuel). Finally, NAVCOMPT screens out
the insupportable budget requests. [Ref.13:p. 36]
His results also show that NAVCOMPT restored more funds
than it initially cut. This increases the importance of the
reclama process as it could be utilized to increase the
initial budget request. Since NAVCOMPT ' s budget is not as
secure on political grounds and updated pricing and economic
assumptions as OSD/OMB ' s budget it is much more willing to
entertain reclamas.
He recommends that claimants take an aggressive role in
budgeting, as the initial budget request is the strongest
determinant of the final budget. The changes of NAVCOMPT and
OSD/OMB are not usually significant enough to greatly change
the initial request. With this assertive budget the claimant
can and should use the reclama process on all cuts made by
NAVCOMPT and generally accept changes made by OSD/OMB.
A study on the relationship between budget assert i veness
and success in various department of defense budget accounts
was conducted by Lieutenant Joseph Scarpa, USN in 1988.
Using the 23 major military appropriations within the
Department of Defense, he looked at this assertive
relationship on the fiscal year budgets of 1977-1988. By
comparing the initial budget request of the claimant to the
budget approved by congress he determined the amount of the
requested change that was ultimately approved. The measure
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used for assert i veness and success was the percentage
increment over the base which was requested and received.
His study agreed with the last two mentioned in that the
largest increases in budgets go to assertive claimants. The
marine corps was particularly successful in gaining large
increases through aggressive budgeting strategies. He found
that "The budget accounts which seem to be most rewarded by
budget assert i veness for Fiscal Years 1977-1988 are
Procurement, Marine Corps; the four services' Military
Personnel accounts; Other Procurement, Air Force; and Other
Procurement, Army. The budget accounts which seem least
responsive to budget assert i veness are Aircraft Procurement,
Navy; Weapons Procurement, Navy; and Research, Development,
Test, and Evaluation, Army. [Ref. 16:p. iii]
Additional studies linking aggressiveness to budgetary
increases have made similar conclusions. Davis, Dempster,
and Wildavsky (1966) suggest that agencies will gain through
advocacy, but that if they ask for amounts much larger than
the appropriating bodies believe reasonable, their
credibility will suffer. This could have a negative effect
on the budget request, and future budgets. Sharkansky (1968)
shows aggressiveness to be a prerequisite for a substantial
budget increase. Sharkansky also finds a high correlation
between gubernatorial support and agency budget success. It
seems to be a safe extrapolation to further suggest that
presidential support of an i n i t i at i ve--budgetary or
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otherwi se-- i s essential for federal agency success. [Ref.
16 :p. 17]
From these studies one can conclude that the most
effective strategy would be to ask for the largest increase
that can be reasonably justified each year. This is not
possible for all agencies every year. Agency assert i veness
is a function of several factors: the values, attitudes, and
orientation of agency administrators, the extent of external
support for the agency and its programs, and the
environmental constraints. [Ref. 12]
Department of Defense budgeting is still very much a
political process in spite of all the attempts to make it
more analytical. The support of the public, the president or
the congress is essential to justify any large incremental
increases in budgets. When a popular call goes out for a SCO
ship navy, a strategic defense initiative, or a B-2 bomber,
this is the time to relate an agencies growth to a popular
issue. Tne budget reviewing agencies will be less willing to
cut funds if they think that the next reviewer will restore
the cuts due to popular or political support for the program.
Agencies with popular or political support of this nature
fine it easy to be aggressive.
Economic conditions also play an important role in
shaping the degree to which a claimant may be aggressive.
Since all of the interservice budgets will eventually come
together as the navy budget, they are all interrelated. In
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times of fixed or reduced spending, increases in one budget
require a cut in another. It is much easier for reviewing
agencies to cut growth in one budget than to cut into the
base of another. Over aggressiveness at these times may also
cause the claimants budget to loose credibility. It will be
examined much more carefully for areas of excess, and the
unwarranted aggressiveness of the agency could be detrimental
to its budget. This limits the ability of the agency to
submit an aggressive budget.
In the next chapter, the budget data for Fisca' years
1990-1994 is analyzed. The actions of the reviewing agencies
are examined to determine if they change during periods of
fiscal constraint, compared to per-iods of growth. The
methods and patterns used by the reviewing agencies are




The data used in this thesis was provided by the NAVCOMPT
Budget Evaluation Group (NCBG). It contains the Operations
and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) budget changes made while
formulating the FY 1990 Presidents' Budget, and was produced
in the late fall of 1988. The data contains the changes made
to the FYDP (Fiscal Years 1990-1994), and to FY 1988 and
1989. These changes include: The initial FYDP budget (00),
The Major Claimants' requested change (01), NAVCOMPTs ' mark-
up (02), NAVCOMPTs' restorals (03), Other DON miscellaneous
adjustments (04), OSD/OMBs' Program Budget Decisions (PBD)
adjustments (05), In some cases other OSD miscellaneous
adjustments (06), and the final O&M budget with these changes
i nc 1 udec
.
A. DATA ANALYSIS
From this cata ! analyzed the O&M budgets of 20 Major
Claimants. Together, their budgets comprise 98.2 percent of
the total 0&M,N budget. These Claimants are listed in Figure
3.1 with their NCBG code. These codes are used throughout
the remainder of this study to identify the major Claimants.
Table 3-1 shows the amounts of the Major Claimants budgets.
This study analyzes:
1. The aggressive/assertive correlation to budget growth
mentioned earlier.
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2. The amount and directions of changes made during each
budget review, and the effect of the change on each
years budget.
3. The methodology used in the changes made by each budget
reviewing body.
4. The effects of the changes on each of the Major
Claimants Budgets.
1. Aggressive/Assertive Correlation
The Claimants aggressiveness is determined by the
amount of the increase in one years budget over the prior
years budget. Through the examination of the Claimants
requested budgets for the fiscal years 1990-1994, and
comparing the amount of each to the prior years budget, the
requested budget increases are measurea. The aggressiveness
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Figure 3.1 Major DON Claimants
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TABLE 3-1
Total O&MN Budget Levels by Claimant
(Numbers are
in Thousands) i f
NCBG Code FY90 91 92 93 94
11 988,577 1,069,652 1,102,097 1,115,695 1,155,388
12 276,956 282,132 289,435 296,616 303,412
15 156,200 164,205 191,749 208,355 212,235
18 1,963,075 2,116,999 2,314,320 2,347,048 2,496,825
19 2,417,646 2,497,945 2,552,497 2,594,376 2,768,406
22 521,060 526,333 544,306 554,292 596,838
23 1,424,046 1,440,575 1,482,098 1,547,509 1,583,186
24 2,846,095 3,954,613 4,257,408 4,565,767 5,046,895
25 347,511 344,162 350,308 362,302 369,734
27 1,745,100 1,802,500 1,872,701 1,962,351 2,030,825
30 987,892 972,772 1,087, 702 1,123,595 1,086,580
39 708,256 745,906 771,461 810,535 843,210
6C 4,910,108 5,059,951 5,407,382 5,579,224 6,340,590
61 218,009 220,602 226,739 225,939 262,347
62 ',,186,891 1,238,705 1,247,092 1,301,315 1,301,734
63 349,774 358,083 374,616 384,582 396,450
65 220,469 246,105 246,050 257,994 254,642
69 101,679 105,062 112,221 114,076 117,221
70 5,335,130 5,552,867 5,000,623 5,670,780 6,510,804
72 541,636 568,974 576,794 566,417 590,808
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TABLE 3-2
Claimant Assert iveness: Increase in Claimant Request to












48 28 11 100
The table shows that the majority of Claimants, (76
percent), requested increases of between C and 9.9 percent,
and 17 percent requested an increase of greater than 10
percent. This compares with Housley's findings of 53 percent
with a 0-9.9 percent increase request, and p e r c e r, '
requesting more than 10 percent. The LeLoup/More 1 and study
measured 20 percent requesting a 0-9.9 percent increase and
68 percent seeking mere than 10 percent. Both of these past
studies were conducted during periods of budget expansion,
during which aggressiveness was encouraged. The current data
indicates that the Claimants become more moderate in their
quest for oudget growth, during periods of fiscal constraint.
In order to assess the success that aggressive
Claimants achieved over this five year period, the growth or
shrinkage of each category of budget request is compared to
the actual budgetary level achieved. Table 3-3 displays the
results of this comparison.
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TABLE 3-3
Changes in Agency Requests Made by Reviewing Bodies
Change in Claimant Number Avg% Avg% Avg%
Request from of (02) Change Change Change








Increase > 15% 6
-7.8 - .6 -2.97
-4.4 -2. 1 + .2
-7.4 - .8 -4.3
-7.7 +
. 1 -1.2
15.2 -1 .7 -8.1
The results of this comparison show that the mcst
aggressive category of Claimants received the largest cuts,
followed by those requesting a 5-9.9 percent increase and
those requesting a decrease. The Claimants requesting a
small (0-4.9 percent), increase received a small increase,
and those requesting an increase of 10-14.9 percent received
a slight decrease.
These findings conflict with those of past studies,
and indicate that an aggressive strategy does not necessarily
result in a budgetary increase. During periods of budgetary
constraint a strategy of seeking a small (0-4.9 percent),
increase is more likely to result in some budgetary growth.
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The one area of consistent agreement is that those
Claimants who request a budget cut, will be cut deeper than
the requested.
Another strategic option available to aggressive
Claimants is to adjust upward the budget being submitted to
Navcompt. Only one Claimant of the twenty studied, employed
this tactic. Table 3-4 shows the amount of their adjustments
to each year's budget, the actions of the reviewing agencies,
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This Claimant's aggressiveness resulted in an
increase in their FY 1990, and 1991 budgets, but their FY
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1992-1994 budgets were cut. The average effect on the five
year budget was a negative 1.9 percent yearly cut in its
budget. This compares to a negative 1.2 percent, average
yearly cut in the budgets of the other 19 Claimants who did
not request a budget adjustment.
Although this sample of one aggressive Claimant does
not provide conclusive evidence; it does indicate that at
least in this case, aggressive use of requested adjustment
increases, during a period of fiscal constraints, did not pay
off.
One assertive strategy which is readily available to
all Claimants is that of program justification. Through
proper justification of each program during the programming
stage of the PPBS process, a Claimant can minimize NAVCOMPT's
initial 02 cut to their budget. The justification for each
line item, submitted with the budget to NAVCOMPT, will have a
large impact on the size of the budget approved. If NAVCOMPT
can relate a line item to an approved program they tend to
approve it. Since the 02 modification to the budget is
consistently the largest budget cut, in every year; if it can
be reduced or eliminated a Claimant will improve the chances
of his budget's final approval. See Tables 3-5 through 3-9,
which show each change to the claimants' budgets.
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rIPELE 3-5
Major OainHit Bxiget Changes
Fiscal Year 1590
CLaiirant NfiOMT HSOMT NRSCCMT QSytMB CffytMB
/iGjustuent I-ark-up REstoral Adjusluail Adjustrret. Misc.
AdjustneTts
NIG 01 02 03 04
Cbae
11 + 4.8 + 4 -1.3
12 + 6.8 + 3.5 + 8
15 -1.7 + 1.9 -6.3
IB -6.1 + 1.9 + .8
19 44.6 -17 + 8.8 + 7.2
22 -3.7 + 3.6 + .5
23 -5.1 + 4.7 + 6
24 L -33 +17.7 + 2.5
25 + 4.3 + .5 -6.5
27 + .3 + 2 + .4
30 -24.6 +21.4 + .1
39 C -9.7 + 6.7 - .6
60 - .6 -1.3 + 2.5
61 +11 + 1.7
62 - .6 + 1 + 3.7
63 -12.5 + 6.5 + .5
65 L -11.7 + 4 + 9.9
69 + 1.1 + .5 + 2.8
71 E + 1.7 + 2.9 + 2.9














































Average -5.01 + 4.64 + 1.77 -1.45 +.02 - .05
Nxber ot cuts 13 1 4 10 1 10
Percentage ot
Clr.inant's Dxgets 65 5 20 50 50
Cut

























Major Claimant Budget Changes
Fiscal Year 1991
02 03 04 05 06 Total
+ 4.6 + 10.3 8.3 2.5 + 3
+ 8.8 + 3.4 + 8.7 19.2 + 1.6
- 1.9 + 2.1 + 2.2 + 5.1 + 7.4
- 7.4 + 2.9 + .7 - 2 - 5.7
-17 + 8.6 + 7.3 + 3.5 + 3.5
- 2.8 + 3.1 + .5 - 1.6 - .9
- 4.8 + 4.8 + 6.2 - 2.9 + 3.3
-32 + 20 + .9 - .2 -11.3
+ 5.3 + .6 - 9.9 - .1 - 5
-
.03 + 2 + .4 + .2 + 2.5
-46 + 32.2 + .1 - 2 -16.2
-12.7 + 9.3 - .6 - 1.6 C - 6.6
+ 5.3 -4 + 1.4 - 5.5 -.02 - 2.8
+ 11 C + 1.7 - 1.7 + .4 + 11.4
-
.3 + 1 4. 3.4 - .8 + 3.3
-12 + 5.8 4- .4 - . 7 c - 6.4
- 7.6 + 3.7 + 13 - 3.4 + 5.6
+ 1.2 + .5 + 4.6 + 1.4 + 7.8
-11.1 + 12 - .04 - 6.4 - 5.6
- 3.4 + 2.3 - .06 - 2.5 - 4.2
Average - 6.14 x 6.03 - '..60 - 2.15 +.02 - .77
Number of cuts 14 1 5 16 1 10
Percentage of
Claimant's Budgets 70 5 25 80 5 50
Cut
All Numbers are in Dercent
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TABLE 3-7




























+ 3 + 7.7 -3.9
+ 1.9 + 2.9 +8.9
- 1.7 + 1.9 +6.7
- 9.8 + 5.7 + .7
-15 + 6.5 +3
- 3.2 + 2.6 + .3
-
.8 + 1.5 +6.2
- 7.4 + 4.1 + .2
+ 5.5 - .9 -8.5
+ .3 + 1.9 + .4





+ 2.5 - .8 - .4
4. + .6
- 1.5 + 1 +3
-13.2 + 8.1 + .5
- 6.1 + 2.9 +9.8
+ 1.1 + .5 + 2.6
-1 1.3 - .8 + 1.3















































Average - 4.8 + 4.3 + 1.5 - 1.4 + .C2 - .74
Numbe- of cuts 12 3 5 16 12
Pe-centage of 60 15 25 80 60
Claimant's Budgets
Cut
All Numbers are in percent
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TABLE 3-8




























- 2.3 + 6.5 +3.9
- 4.1 + 2.3 +8.7
- 1.6 + 1.7 +4.4
- 9.3 + 5 + .7
-16.3 + 6.9 + .7
- 3.2 + 2.5 + .2
- 1 + 1.7 +6
-25.2 + 12 + 1.8
+ 4.7 - 2 -8.2
-
.1 + 1.9 + .4
-42 +28.3 + . 1
-13.2 + 8.9 - .5
+ 2.5 - .9 -3.6
+ 8.9 C + .6
- 1.8 + .9 +2.9
-14.2 - 9.4 + .5
- 5.6 + 2.8 +9.3
+ 1.2 + .5 +3.3
-
.£ - 2.5 -3.4














-1.2 c - 6
-4.9 -.08 - 6.9
-
.7 + .4 + 9.2
-3 - 1.1
-1.4 C - 5.7
-4 + 2.4
+4.5 + 9.5
-5.9 + .06 - 7.6
-2.9 c - 4.8
Average - 6.3 + 4.7 + 1.4 -1.4 -1.7
Nunoe- o* cuts 16 2 5 16 1 12
Percentage of 80 10 25 50 5 60
Claimant's Budgets
Cut
All Numbers are in percent
TABLE 3-9



















15 - 1.5 + 1.6 -5 +10.6
18 -11 + 6.5 - .5 - 1.8
19 +.8 -16.4 + 6.3 -3.7 + 4.4
22 - 3.4 + 2.4 -1.7 - 2.2
23 -1.7 +1.9 +6.1 -2.3
24 -19.6 +7.2 +4.2 +1.2
25 - .2 - 2.4 -7.6 - 2.2
27 + .4 + 1.9 + .4 - .6
30 -42.6 +28.4 -1 - 2.1
39 -13 +9 -3.4 - 1.1
60 + 1.5 - .8 -5.7 + 2 +.2
61 + 5.9 +9.3 - 1.2 +.4
62 -2.5+1 +1.4 - 3.7
63 -14.5 +9.7 +.1 -1.8
65 -5.5 +2.7 +5.2 -4.7
69 + 1.1 + .5 +2.4 +5
70 +1.3 -.7 -5.4 +.8 -.2




















Average 6.74 +4 .3 + .33 - .46 + .02 - 2.93
Number cf cuts 15 3 10 14 1 14
Percentage of 75 15 50 70 5 70
Claimant's Budgets
Cuts
A"' Numbers are in percent
Programs wrier lack strong justifications, often
receive large cuts from NAVCOMPT. Of the Claimants vyith the
biggest 02 cuts, specifically NCBG codes 24, and 63, many
programs were reduced or eliminated completely due to
inadequate justification. For NCBG code 24, 31 percent of
its cut consisted of reductions and unjustified program cuts.
For NCBG code 63 they consisted of 18.5 percent of the cuts.
The Claimants with the smallest NAVCOMPT cuts, and in some
cases, increases, were able to better justify their programs.
Over the coarse of the five years reviewed, NAVCOMPT
increased Claimants budgets 28 times. In these cases very
few cuts were made for programs being unjustified. The few
that were made were so small in size, that they did not
impact on the budget.
This data clearly indicates that an aggressive
justification strategy is an effective method of avoiding
budget cuts, during periods of fiscal constraint.
Another option available is to utilize the Reclama
process to nullify the initial NAVCOMPT cut, or to actually
increase the budget. In 17 percent of the cases over this
five year period, Claimants were able tc achieve a budget
increase in the initial NAVCOMPT mark-up, and another
increase from the Rec 1 ama-restorat ion process. In another 19
percent of the cases, Claimants were able to get back more in
the Rec 1 ama- restorat i on process than was cut in the initial
mark-up .
The key to success in this area, is to fully
understand the reasons for the initial NAVCOMPT cuts, and to
justify well enough to prevent cuts, or achieve its restoral
after the cut. Some Claimants are clearly better at this than
others
.
A detailed description of the reasons for all cuts is
provided to the Claimants when their budgets receive cuts.
The more aggressive Claimants will study and research each
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one of these cuts, and plan a strategy to have each restored.
A reclarna is then submitted for each line item which was cut.
These reclamas must address the specific concerns of NAVCOMPT
and be convincing enough to cause a restoration of funding.
2. Changes of Reviewing Authorities
In Tables 3-5 through 3-9 the budget changes of
NAVCOMPT' s mark-up, NAVCOMPT's restoral, NAVCOMPT '
s
miscellaneous adjustment, and the OSD/OMB adjustments are
shown. From this data clear patterns of action are seer.
The initial NAVCOMPT (02), mark-up is clearly a
budget cut, for the average Claimant. This cut is deepest,
and affects the "largest number of Claimants in the last two
years of the FYDP. For- FY1293 and FY1994 cuts apportioned by
NAVCOMPT (02) adjustments effects 80 percent of the Claimants
and averages -6.30 percent and -6.74 percent respectively.
For the first two years, FY1990 and FY1991, it cuts 65
percent and 70 percent c* the Claimants, and averages -5.01
percent, and - 6.14 percent. The middle year of the FYDP,
FY1932 is the smallest cut, and it only affects 62 percent of
the Claimants. This cut averages -4.8 percent in size. This
indicates that an appropriate strategy would be to request
the largest budgetary increase for the third year of the
FYDP .
The NAVCOMPT (03) restoral gives back almost as much
as the initial mark-up takes away. This restoral however;
does not necessarily give back the funds to the Claimants who
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had their budgets cut. The (03) restoral redistributes the
budgets by returning little to the Claimants with the deepest
cuts, and giving more to the Claimants with (02) increases.
In FY1990 the agencies with the five deepest cuts, had cuts
which averaged 19.76 percent. Their restorals averaged 11.68
percent. This is a restoral rate of 59.11 percent of their
cuts. The Claimants with the five biggest (02) increases,
had increases which averaged 5.72 percent, and (03)
additional increases of 2.13 percent. This is a restoral
rate of 38.11 percent of their initial increase. This
relationship of budgetary redistribution was consistent for
every year of the FYDP
.
The ten Claimants which fell in the middle of the
deepest cuts, and the smallest cuts or increases, were able
to get most of their (02) cuts restored. These ten Claimants
averaged a FY1990 cut of 3 percent, and had a restoral rate
of 2.35 percent. This is a restoral rate of 78.33 percent.
Of these ten claimants, only one was restored more than it
was cut, while one which was cut received an additional cut,
and two who received increases gained a further increase.
Every Claimant which received an (02) increase also received
an (03) increase. These findings also remained relatively
constant throughout the FYDP.
The NAVCOMPT (04) miscellaneous adjustment was a
slight budget increase for most Claimants. It averaged +1.32
percent over the FYDP period, and cut only 29 percent of the
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Claimant's budgets. Most of these cuts came in the outyears.
In FY1990 only 20 percent were cut. In FY1991-1993, 25
percent received cuts, and in FY1994 50 percent received
cuts .
While the (04) adjustment did not have a significant
affect on most of the Claimants, it did greatly change the
budgets of a few. Of the 29 cuts over the FYDP period, 25 of
then affected the same 7 Claimants. Two Claimants, NCBQ
codes 25, and 39 were cut every year. Code 25 averaged a
7.02 percent yearly cut, while Code 39 only received a 1.2
percent average yearly cut. Other Claimants received large
yearly increases. Code 65 received an average 9.44 percent
yearly increase, and Code 12 received a 8.54 percent yearly
i ncrease
.
The (C5) OSD/OMB adjustment was an average cut in
eve r y year. It averaged -1.37 percent over the FYDP period,
and cut 72 percent of the budgets. These cuts were fairly
evenly distributed over the FYDP period, with FY199C
receiving the least. While most of these cuts were small in
size, and only a few Claimants gained, a small number were
affected significantly. Code 12 received an average annual
cut of 11.14 percent, and Code 65 received a 4.02 average
yearly cut. These two were the biggest losers. Codes 15 and
69 were the biggest gainers. Code 15 received an average
6.08 percent increase, and Code 69 averaged a 3.88 percent
i ncrease
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The (06) OSD/OMB miscellaneous adjustment is a very
small increase which averaged +.02 percent yearly, and only
affected three Claimants. This adjustment reflects the
budget fine tuning done by NAVCOMPT to align the budget to
the OSD/OMB total cut. Due to its size it is of little




Most budget changes fall into three categories.
These categories are: pricing, timing, and programming. The
pricing cuts or increases reflect the amount to be spent on a
program. Through spending more or less on a program, or
reacting to economic conditions which affect input prices, a
program's price can be increased or decreased. Timing
changes refer to when a program is to come on line, or the
growth of a program. Through stretching out of a program or
cutting growth, the amount spent per year can be reduced.
Program modifications are made by cancelling a program,
adding a new program, or altering a current program's size.
Program modifications are made to reflect decisions made
during the programming phase of the PPBS process.
The reviewing agencies use all of these
methodologies, plus miscellaneous adjustments to make their
budget changes. Through the examination of the five largest
Claimant's line item changes, the methodologies of each
reviewing phase are analyzed. Table 3-10 shows the results
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of this analysis, and Table 3-11 displays the amount of each
change with its percent of total change.
TABLE 3-10
Number of Budget Changes by Type and Level of Review
PR = Pricing T = Timing P = Program
NCBG 02 03 04 05
Code PR T P PR T P PR T P PR T P
18 48 1 6 33 14 23 2 8
19 22 10 9 12 10 4 31 2 32 1 26
24 71 13 10 42 10 3 39 4 47 26
60 73 4 13 23 40 2 14 55 1 34
70 65 3 25 27 2 7 48 S 56 2 29














ftiount 1420333 270100 23658G 927494 117663 64875 115148 76225 378090 80442 15328 517193
Percent
of 73.7 14 12.3 83.6 10.6 5.8 20.2 13.4 66.4 -19.1 -3.6 122.7
Change
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The budget changes of the reviewing agencies are the
product of budget evaluations. These evaluations do not make
program decisions, but they do make program validity
judgements. If a line item does not justifiably support an
approved program, it is not funded. Previously approved and
budgeted programs are also affected by program changes and
cuts are made to reflect decisions made during the
programming phase of PPBS. Since a particular line item may
apply to more than one program, it could be partially cut to
reflect changes to one program. These types of cuts a^e
termed program cuts, as they reflect changes in funding
caused by previously made programming decisions. Pricing
cuts are made tc distribute the limited DON resources to all
of the approved programs. Timing cuts are made stretch out
programs and cut the immediate expenditures due.
The initial NAVCOMPT mark-up of these five claimants
involved charges to a total of 373 line items. Many of the
line ; terrs were affected by more than one change. Most of
the NAVCOMPT mark-up changes (74.8 percent), involved pricing
changes. Timing changes affected only 8.3 percent of the
line items changed. This low figure indicates NAVCOMPT '
s
possible reluctance to stretch out programs. Program changes
reflect 16.9 percent of the line item changes. The amount of
the adjustments also indicate that pricing changes represent
most of the total change (73.7 percent). These changes cut
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into the share of line items that support scaled back or
cancelled programs.
The NAVCOMPT restoral phase affects 173 line items or
46.4 percent of the number involved in the initial mark-up.
Of these line items, 79.2 percent are pricing changes, 12.7
percent are timing changes, and 8.1 percent are programing
changes. The amount of these changes also reflect the number
of changes in weight, see Table 3-11.
The NAVCOMPT miscellaneous adjustment phase is
concerned primarily with economic projections, and seldom
ejects the same line items that were changed in the first
twc phases. it involves changes to 204 line items. These
changes are broken down into pricing (84.3 percent), timing
(2.5 percent), and programming (13.2 percent). The amount of
these changes indicates that the actual size of the
programming changes are much larger than the pricing changes.
Although the programming changes reflect 13.2 percent of the
number of changes, the> comprise 65.4 percent of the amount
of change.
The OSD/OMB review affects 342 line items. This is a
broad based review which cuts more heavily (36 percent), into
line items reelecting program support than the other budget
reviews. Still the largest number of changes (62.3 percent),
reflect pricing changes. Timing changes involve only 1.7
percent of the line : tems. The pricing and timing changes
act to offset the programming cuts. While the pricing and
49
timing adjustments increase the budgets, the programming cuts
account for the entire budget decrease.
The majority of all the changes made (73.4 percent)
are classified as pricing changes. The next largest category
is programing changes with 20.7 percent of the total. Timing
changes only account for 5.9 percent of the total. In dollar
amount the programming changes are the largest category.
They reflect 46.5 percent of the total change, while pricing
changes account for 44.4 percent. Timing changes reflect 9.1
percent of the total amount of change.
Since pricing and programming changes together make
up 94.1 percent of the number of budget changes, and 90.0
percent of the amount of change, the Major Claimants should
focus on this area to strengthen their budget proposals. The
strategy of effectively justifying line item budget levels to
approved programs is strongly recommended.
A Claimant must be careful in drafting line item
justifications, which are submitted with the line items to
NAVCOMPT for their Initial mark-up. If the share of a line
item which is perceived to be allocated to a changed program
is too large, the cut could negatively effect the other
programs supported. To avoid this the Claimant should follow
the programming process closely. When program support
changes, the line item justifications can be reviewed to
ensure that they properly reflect the support provided to
each program. This will prepare Claimants for the reclama
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process early, and enable them to develop a strategy to
defend budget levels. This strategy will help restore both
pricing and programming cuts.
During the reclama restoral process NAVCOMPT, will
give back almost as much as it initially cut. These
restorals will favor the claimants who best justify their
funding levels to approved programs. If a claimant has done
an effective job in his initial POM justification it will
make the task of drafting strong reclamas that much easier.
It is important that each cut be countered with a reclama,
and that each reclama tie the funding level budgeted to the
success of a program.
The NAVCOMPT adjustment phase is more difficult to
prepare for, as it is primarily concerned with NAVCOMPT's
economic projections, and reclamas are not submitted to
change them. The initial line item justification of funding
is the strongest defense for this phase of the review
process
.
The OSD/OMB review is essentially an across the board
cut, primarily affecting the areas of pricing and
programming. The best strategy to defend against this cut,
is to gain the support of NAVCOMPT during the initial three
phases of the review process. Through an aggressive
justification strategy, the Claimant can affect the success
of his budget as it progresses through the budget review
process
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4. The Effects of the Changes on Each Major Claimant
Some of the Major Claimants were much more successful
at budgeting than were others. Tables 3-12 and 3-13 list the
budget growth by years, and the yearly average growth for
each of the Major Claimants. From these tables the clear
winners and losers can be identified.
TABLE 3-12
Major Claimants Ranked by Percent of Total Change
92 91 92 93 94
(61) +13.8 (61) • . . . *"Y (15) + 13.4 (15) + 11.8 (61) + 14.3
(69) + 7.3 (69) + 7.8 (69) + 9.8 (69) + 9.5 (69) + 9.1
(11) + 6.3 (15) + 7.4 (61) + 9.6 (61) + 9.2 (11) + 6.1
(23) + 4.8 (65) + 5.6 (11) + 5.3 M 1> (15) + 5.7
(62) + 4.7 (19) + 3.5 (23) + 3.2 (23) + 2.8 (23) + 4
(27) + 3.7 (23) + 3.2 (65) + 2.9 (65) + 2.4 (27) + 2
(70) + 2.7 (62) + 3.3 (27) + 2.8 (27) + 2 (12) - 1.1
(12) + 1.9 (11) + 3 (12) + 2.5 (12) + .5 (65) - 2.3
(19) + 1.5 (27) + 2.5 (62) - .1 (62) - 1.1 (60) - 2.9
(22) + .1 (12) + 1.6 (19) - 1.5 (22) - 2.3 (70) - 3.2
(25) - .75 (22) - .9 (22) - 1.6 C9) - 4.7 (62) - 3.9
(65) - 2.2 (60) - 2.8 (60) - 3.4 (72) - 4.8 (22) _ c
(72) - 3.5 (72) - 4.2 (18) - 4.3 (18) - 4.9 (72) - 5.9
(60) - 3.6 (25) - 5- (25) -4.5 (63) -5.7 (63) - 6.6
(39) - 4.6 (70) - 5.6 r-rn\K 1 U> - 4.8 (39) - 6 (18) - 6.9
(18) - 4.8 (18) - 5.7 (72) - 4.9 (60) - 6.9 (39) - 8.4
(63) - 5.1 (63) - 6.4 (63) - 5.6 (25) - 7 (19) - 8.6
(15) - 5.2 (39) - 6.6 (39) - 7.7 (70) - 7.6 (25) -12.4
(30) - 5.6 (24) -11.3 (24) -11.4 (24) -11.3 (24) -15.4
(24) -12.5 (30) -16.2 (30) -14.4 (30) -15 (30) -17.2
TABLE 3-13
Claimants Average Yearly Budget Change
NCBG Code Change in Percent









2 2 - 1.94










Of the Major Claimants studied, nine received average
annual increases, while eleven were cut. The biggest overall
winner was NCBG code 61 (Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval
Forces Europe), with ar, average increase of 11.66 percent.
In second place was NCBG code 69 (Naval Security Group
Command Headquarters), with an 8.7 percent increase. The
Marine Corps did very well achieving an average annual
increase of 2.6 percent. This was the sixth largest average
increase in the study. This finding agrees with that of
Scarpa's thesis, in that it shows the high level of budgetary
success that the Marine Corps enjoys. [Ref. 16] All of the
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Claimants which achieved average increases enjoyed strong
NAVCOMPT support while only three were not cut on the average
by OSD/OMB. This indicates the importance of NAVCOMPTs
support, mentioned earlier, in gaining budgetary increases.
Of the eleven losers NCBG code 30 (Strategic Systems
Project Office), received the largest cut. Their budget was
reduced an average "13.68 percent yearly. Code 24 (Naval Sea
Systems Command), was second with an average cut of 12.38
percent. All of the Claimants who received cuts, failed to
gain NAVCOMPTs support for their budgets. Only two of these
Claimants received CSD/OMB support, and this support was not
strong enough to overcome the NAVCOMPT cuts.
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
The past studies done in this area, focus on an
aggressiveness strategy o* requesting large increases. While
that strategy has been successful during periods of budgetary
growth, it is net successful during periods of budget
constraint. During this period a strategy of requesting
moderate increases was the most successful.
The study conducted by Housley found that NAVCOMPTs role
was not to balance the extremes, but to check for budget
feasibility, verify accuracy, and ensure that the budget
reflected approved programs. [Ref. 13] This study agrees
with those findings. It also agrees with Housley that
NAVCOMPT' s budgets'-;, support is cr :t"ca". tc achieving a
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budgetary increase, and that the key to gaining this support
is to utilize the reclama process successfully.
This current analysis also shows that the OSD/OMB cut is
very mechanical in nature. Almost all claimants are cut, and
various aggressive strategies do not affect this cut. This
agrees with the findings of both Housley and the
LeLoup/More 1 and Study. [Ref. 12] In addition, all of the
studies which examined agencies requesting decreases show
similar findings. If an agency or Claimant requests a budget
cut, they will have that cut increased, and will receive a
smaller budget than they requested.
Finally, all of the studies agree that the initial budget
request is the strongest determinant of the final budget.




A Major Claimant who seeks a budget increase or desires
to protect his budget from a sharp cut has various strategies
available for use. The Claimant should request a moderate
budgetary increase and use an aggressive justification policy
to gain support of NAVCOMPT. If the line item budget that
NAVCOMPT receives is easily related to approved programs, the
size of the initial mark-up cut can be minimized. This may
be accomplished by fully relating the spending levels to
approved programs during the programming phase. During the
reclama phase, the Claimant should aggressively seek to have
all of the initial cuts restored. The Claimant should use a
strategy of justifying the restoral of funds, and relating
these funds to approved programs. This strategy should
achieve a high fund restoral rate. After achieving this
support from NAVCOMPT the Claimant will be able to accept the
cut made by OSD/OMB, and still achieve a budgetary increase,
or a modest decrease.
B. NAVCOMPT ACTIONS
The NAVCOMPT reviews align the Claimants budgets to the
approved programs, and distributes the limited DON funding to
these programs. The NAVCOMPT initial mark-up is usually the
largest budget cut, and it cuts deepest into the budgets of
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the last two years of the FYDP , while it cuts the least into
the middle year. The size of the cut varies significantly
for different claimants and many receive a budgetary increase
during this review.
The NAVCOMPT reclama review restores almost all of the
initial cuts. These restorals favor the claimants who
receive initial NAVCOMPT increases, and give little back to
the claimants with the deepest cuts. This indicates that the
successful Claimants have done a more effective job of
relating their line item funding levels to approved programs.
The final NAVCOMPT adjustment was a slight increase for
the average Claimant. It averaged +1.32 percent in size, and
primarily reflected pricing changes. It seldom affected line
items which were altered in the initial two NAVCOMPT reviews.
C. OSD/OMB ACTIONS
The OSD/OMB review is usually (72 percent), a budget cut.
On the average it is very small (1.36 percent), but some
Claimants were cut up to 11.14 percent, while others gained
up to 6.08 percent. This review primarily affects the areas
of pricing, and programing. While OSD/OMB does not make
restorals, they do make a few economic based, miscellaneous
adjustments. These adjustments are very small (.02 percent),
and affect only a few Claimants.
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D. SUMMARY
This Thesis examined the budgetary process and the
actions which the DON budget reviewing agencies take to
modify the O&M , N budgets, submitted by the Major Claimants.
It identifies the various strategies used by these reviewing
agencies to modify the budgets submitted, and analyzes the
strategies used by the Major Claimants to protect their
budgets
.
The study found that the initial budget submitted by the
Claimant is the strongest determinant of the size of the
final budget. During this period of fiscal constraint the
most successful claimants followed a strategy of requesting
small budgetary increases (0-4.9 percent).
The initial NAVCOMPT mark-up is usually the largest
budget cut. It cuts deepest into the Claimants requesting
large increases, and cuts significantly less of the middle
year of the FYDP's budget. The Claimants which received
budgetary increases were successful in avoiding a sharp
budget cuts in this phase.
The NAVCOMPT reel ama/restoral review gave back almost as
much as was cut in the mark-up phase. These restorals
favored the Claimants with the smallest mark-up cuts and
those which received initial increases. Claimants should
employ a strategy of submitting a reclama for every cut
received, and justifying the restoral by relating the funds
to approved programs.
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The NAVCOMPT miscellaneous adjustment is usually a small
increase. It is based primarily on pricing changes based on
economic changes.
The OSD/OMB review is an across the board cut. This cut
is usually small, and it is applied to most of the Claimants.
A few Claimants received cuts up to 11.14 percent, and a few
received gains of up to 4.02 percent. This review reflects
large cuts to programs, and small increases in the form of
pricing and timing changes. These small increases act to
decrease the size of the cut. There are not any clearly
identifiable strategies to limit this cut as it is mechanical
in nature and does not favor any of the major claimants.
The major conclusion is that the budgetary process is
complex and ever changing. With a thorough understanding of
all the intricacies of the PPBS process, and a firm knowledge
of the review process, Major Claimants should be able to
better plan and gain approval of their budgets.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The question; "Why are some of the Major Claimants
consistently more effective at achieving budgetary success
than others?", would be worth examining in more depth. A
comparison study of the budget organizations of the clear




The budgetary cuts made by NAVCOMPT's mark-up and listed
as unjustified, would also be worth a closer examination. By
tracking the initial POM justifications through the
programming stage, to the line item budget, it may become
clear why some of the line items appear to be unjustified.
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